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Congress assumed a more active role in the federal budget
process with the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974 (CBA) , legislation which created the House and
Senate Budget Committees. During the first years of the CBA,
these committees were effective in establishing the budget
process. In 1981, they contributed to a dramatic shift in
fiscal policy. Consequently, the budget process assumed a
magnitude which was beyond the purview of a single set of
committees. The remainder of decade was dominated by large
coalitions and budget summits, obscuring the role of the
Budget Committees. In the mid-1980 's, concern over the
deficit shifted the focus of the budget process further from
the Budget Committees. Gramm-Rudman-Hol lings legislated
deficit totals and instituted the sequester to cut spending
when Congress could not. The most recent revision of the
budget process is the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA)
,
which further displaces the Budget Committees. Past trends
suggest the BEA will be superseded by legislation which may
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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been more than seventeen years since the Congres-
sional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (CBA) was
signed into law by President Richard Nixon. With that legis-
lation, Congress expanded its role in the federal budget
process. A new budget process was created, and with it a new
set of committees - the House and Senate Budget Committees.
Initially, there was a perception that these two commit-
tees would dominate the budget process, and some concern that
too much power had been concentrated in their hands. Their
role was to act as the budget authority in Congress, setting
fiscal priorities and overseeing the budget process. However,
a cursory observation of the number of revisions which the
budget process has undergone since 1974 suggests that the
process was flawed.
The most recent revision of the budget process occurred
when President George Bush signed a reconciliation bill which
contained the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA) . With this
legislation, there was speculation that the budget process,
and therefore the Budget Committees, had become superfluous.
This paper will chronicle the history of the congressional
budget process from the perspective of the Budget Committees.
Their role in the process will be examined from their incep-
tion in 1974 through the present. Chapter I describes the
events in the late 1960 's and early 1970 's which contributed
to the budget reform sentiment in Congress, resulting in the
in the CBA. The provisions of the CBA are examined, as well
as the expectations the new process held for the Budget
Committees.
Chapter II discusses the first five years of congressional
budgeting under the CBA. This was a period where the Budget
Committees played a significant role in institutionalizing the
new process, rather than affecting fiscal policy. Various
instances are used to describe the interaction of the Budget
Committees with the other congressional stakeholders in the
budget process, and how these forces accommodated each other.
Chapter III describes the first four years of budgeting
during the Reagan administration. At the beginning of this
period in 1981, the Budget Committees enjoyed an elevated
status. As part of a larger budget coalition, they used the
reconciliation provisions of the CBA to significantly impact
fiscal policy. The remainder of the chapter describes the
subsequent decline in the influence of the Budget Committees,
as these coalitions and the resulting budget summitry forced
the Budget Committees to the periphery of the budget process.
Chapter IV covers the period from 1985 to 1989 in the
congressional budget process. This was the era of automatic
budgeting. Concern over the growing deficit forced Congress
to revise the budget process with the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (and a subsequent
revision in 1987), otherwise known as Gramm-Rudman-Hol lings
(GRH) . This legislation set deficit totals into law, and
instituted seguestration - a method to automatically cut
spending to meet these totals if Congress could not. Both
versions of GRH are reviewed with regard to their impact on
the budget process. Together with budget summits, this
legislation continued to diminish the role of the Budget
Committees.
The final chapter outlines the most recent budget reform
legislation, the BEA. The BEA, drawing upon the provisions of
previous budget summits, not only specified deficit totals,
but constrained spending as well. These provisions continue
to obscure the role of the Budget Committees. Finally,
speculation will be made as to the future of the Budget
Committees and budgeting under the BEA.
II. THE CBA OF 1974 AND THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET COMMITTEES
A combination of political, economic, and budgetary
conflicts marked the era which led Congress to reform the
Federal Budget Process through the creation of the Congres-
sional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (CBA)
.
Aside from the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 which estab-
lished the executive budget, the CBA was perhaps the most
significant budget legislation produced by Congress. Analysis
of the CBA, however, first requires the examination of the
events which led up to the legislation.
A. SYMPTOMS OF A BROKEN PROCESS-IMPOUNDMENTS
While the war in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal
dominated national attention, President Nixon challenged the
power of the legislative branch by impounding appropriated
funds. The President thwarted the intent of Congress by
financing the secret bombing of Cambodia with funds authorized
for Air Force operations in Vietnam. Further, President Nixon
used his power of impoundment to effectively cancel or inhibit
several domestic programs to which he was opposed. Although
previous Presidents had exercised their impoundment power,
none had used it to the extent that President Nixon had to
influence policy.
B. ECONOMIC SYMPTOMS
Aside from President Nixon's impoundments and transfer of
funds, economic turbulence was exacerbating the breakdown of
the budget process. As shown in Table 1, inflation (measured
by the Consumer Price Index) had increased dramatically in the
ten years preceding 1974. According to current economic
theorists, who believed they understood the economy well
enough to control it, unemployment and inflation were
inversely related. Yet the simultaneous increase in both,
known as stagflation, led to the creation of a new measure of
economic health, the Misery Index, the summation of the rates
of unemployment and inflation. By 1974, the Misery index
exceeded 15 percent.
TABLE 1
ECONOMIC INDICATORS AND BUDGET DEFICITS/SURPLUS
Consumer Price Unemployment Deficit or Surplus











Source: John Cranford, Budgeting for America (Washington












Budget surpluses during the decade preceding the CBA of
1974 were rare, while deficits exceeding $20 billion, the
largest since World War II, were increasingly common (see
Table 1) . Deficits of this magnitude were viewed as evidence
of the procedural breakdown in Congress. Prior to the CBA of
1974, deficits and surpluses were a result of the fragmented
appropriations process. Congress had little indication, apart
from the President's budget, of the size of the deficit or
surplus until the passage of all of the appropriations bills.
While it can be argued that deficit spending is an important
instrument in shaping fiscal policy, Congress was unable to
directly evaluate or control the degree to which deficit
spending was used. 1
D. BREAKDOWN OF THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS
The growth of entitlements and other mandatory spending
and the indexation of these expenditures placed a substantial
portion of the budget outside the direct control of Congress.
In the seven years prior to the CBA of 1974, uncontrollable
outlays as a percentage of total budget outlays increased from
63 percent to 75 percent. 2 This was due in most part to the
growth of outlays for the social security trust fund, public
assistance programs such as Medicaid, and interest on the
public debt. The Appropriations Committees were further
frustrated by the use of "backdoor" spending such as contract
and borrowing authority. By 1974, the Appropriations
6
Committees controlled only a small and diminishing portion of
total spending.
Additional evidence of the disintegration of the appro-
priations process was the failure to enact appropriations
bills by the start of the fiscal year. Prior to the CBA, the
last time all of the regular appropriations bills had been
approved on time was 1948, and between 1972 and 1975 no
appropriations bills were enacted by the start of the fiscal
year. 3 Further, there was no unified process by which
Congress could evaluate individual appropriations bills
relative to one another, or their total relative to any
spending or deficit target.
E. INCONGRUITY OF REVENUES AND SPENDING
Deficits occur when receipts of the federal government are
less than the outlays. While the Appropriations Committees
were seen as responsible for government spending, the Revenue
Committees (House Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance
Committee) were responsible for the receipts. Prior to the
CBA of 1974, however, the Revenue Committees acted relatively
independently of the Appropriations Committees. There was no
single process by which Congress could directly juxtapose and
evaluate spending and revenue totals. Deficits increased as
tax revenues failed to increase at the same rate as federal
spending.
F. INCEPTION OF REFORM
In light of the growing realization of the need for budget
reform, in late 1972 Congress convened the Joint Study
Committee on Budget Control. The Joint Study Committee
consisted primarily of members of the standing committees
which were central to the old process, and while these
committees had the most to gain from budget reform, they also
had the most at risk. Twenty-eight of the thirty-two members
of the Joint Study Committee were members of the House and
Senate Appropriations Committees, the House Ways and Means
Committee, or the Senate Finance Committee. 4
The Joint Study Committee on Budget Control, established
on October 27, 1972, was the first of several committees which
would investigate budget reform, ultimately resulting in the
CBA of 1974. While they were willing to concede power in
proposing the creation of the Budget Committees, their recom-
mendation was that two-thirds of the Budget Committees
membership be reserved for members of the Appropriations and
Revenue Committees. 5 The final composition of these commit-
tees, as specified in the legislation, provided each chamber
with a different allocation of the membership for the two
committees. The recommendations of the Joint Study Committee,
however, indicate the perception of the potential power which
would be held by these committees.
8
G. THE CBA OF 197 4
An examination of the Declaration of Purposes at the
beginning of the CBA of 1974 would demonstrate that all of the
previously mentioned factors contributed to the creation of
the legislation. According to the Declaration, this new
legislation was essential:
1. To ensure effective congressional control over the
budgetary process;
2. To provide for the congressional determination each year
of the appropriate level of Federal revenues and
expenditures
;
3. To provide for a system of impoundment control;
4. To establish national budget priorities; and
5. To provide for the furnishing of information by the
executive branch in a manner that will assist the
Congress in discharging its duties. 6
The CBA of 1974 revised the budget process in several
significant ways. It created the Budget Committees to
facilitate the budget process, most notably through the
production of two annual concurrent budget resolutions. The
Congressional Budget Office was created to provide the legis-
lative branch with a complement to the executive branch's
Office of Management and Budget, giving Congress its own
independent source of budget information. The Act provided a
specific timetable dictating deadlines for completion of the
various stages of the budget process. The beginning of the
fiscal year was shifted from July 1st to October 1st to allow
an additional three months after the submission of the
President's budget to complete the authorizations and
9
appropriations process. Provisions were made to control
backdoor spending, a means of circumventing the old process.
And, in the last of 10 titles, the CBA of 1974 gave Congress
increased control over impoundments by the executive branch.
H. BUDGET COMMITTEES
The creation of the Budget Committees was an addition to
the existing budgeting structure which included Authorizing
Committees, as well as Appropriations and Revenue Committees.
While each of the budget participants gained some influence
over the process, budget reform would require some redistri-
bution of power, particularly in favor of the newly formed
Budget Committees.
The rules on the composition of the House Budget Committee
allow for five members each from the Committee on Appropria-
tions and the Committee on Ways and Means, with the majority
of the 2 3 members being drawn from the other standing
committees. Further, no member of the House may serve on the
Budget Committee for more than two (now three) of five
successive Congresses.
There was no provision for required composition of the
Senate Budget Committee and its members are assigned through
the normal committee process.
The CBA of 1974 and the Budget Committees were to
centralize and rationalize the budget process, coordinating
the fragmented appropriations process and providing an
accordance between the Appropriations and the Revenue
10
Committees. The legislation was to accomplish this
coordination in several ways.
I. THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE
Title II of the Act establishes the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) . The function of the new office was to provide
Congress with its own source of budgetary information,
information on authorizations, appropriations and revenues,
and information on the economy and its impact on the budget.
The CBO had the authority to draw this information directly
from the various departments and agencies of the executive
branch. Although the primary responsibility of the CBO was to
facilitate the role of the Budget Committees by providing them
with budget information, they were to be available to other
congressional committees involved in spending or taxing.
Aside from being first and foremost at the disposal of the
Budget Committees, the Budget Committees had additional
influence over this new office. They were to continually
review the performance of the CBO. Further, while the
director of the CBO was to be appointed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the
Senate, it was the Budget Committees who had the responsi-
bility to make the recommendations.
Prior to April 1 of each year, the Congressional Budget
Office is required to submit its report to the Budget
Committees, as required by the budget timetable. The report
is to include alternate levels of revenue, outlays, and budget
11
authority, as well as variations on the President's budget
request based on the CBO's economic assumptions for the
upcoming fiscal year.
J. BUDGET TIMETABLE
The timetable provided in Title III of the legislation
specifies deadlines for milestones in the budget process (see
Table 2) . It requires that the President's budget be
submitted by the 15th day after Congress meets. With this
information, the standing committees of each house shall
submit to their respective Budget Committee along with the
Joint Economic Committee and the Joint Committee on Internal
Revenue Taxation, their views and estimates of their respec-
tive area of the budget. Further, the standing committees of
each house are to provide their estimates of the amounts of
new budget authority and outlays for the upcoming fiscal year.
K. BUDGET RESOLUTIONS
With this collective information, the President's budget
submission, the submissions of the various committees and the
report of the CBO, the Budget Committees were to begin the
compilation of the first of two concurrent budget resolutions,
the primary means by which the Budget Committees were to
assert their influence on the budget process. Concurrent
resolutions on the budget are not signed by the President and

















President submits current services budget
President submits his budget.
Committees and joint committees submit
reports to Budget Committees.
Congressional Budget Office
report to Budget Committees.
submits
October 1
Budget Committees report the first con-
current resolution on the budget to their
Houses.
Committees report bills and resolutions
authorizing new budget authority.
Congress completes action on first con-
current resolution on the budget.
Congress completes action on bills and
resolutions providing new budget authority
and new spending authority.
Congress completes action on second
reguired concurrent resolution on the
budget.
Congress completes action on reconcilia-
tion bill or resolution, or both,
implementing second reguired concurrent
resolution.
Fiscal year begins.
Source: U.S., Statutes at Large , Vol. 88.
a means by which Congress can regulate its spending and taxing
activities.
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The first concurrent resolution, to be completed by May 15
of each year, was to be an estimate from which the other
participants in the Congressional Budget Process could begin
to formulate their respective portions of the budget. The
first concurrent resolution was to be non-binding, providing
estimates of total outlays and budget authority as well as
levels for each functional category. Further, it would
estimate the levels of revenues, the resulting surplus or
deficit and the level of the public debt.
The first resolution established the Budget Committees as
an integral part of the budget process. As included in the
legislation and subject to a point of order, no bill providing
new budget or spending authority, or changes in revenues or
the federal debt may be considered by Congress until the first
concurrent budget resolution had been adopted.
The second resolution further emphasized the potential
power of the Budget Committees. The second resolution, to be
completed by September 15, was a binding resolution,
essentially revising the figures of the first resolution and
providing reconciliation instructions if necessary.
L. RECONCILIATION INSTRUCTIONS
Reconciliation instructions are the amount by which a
committee must change the portion of the budget over which it
has jurisdiction to accommodate the final totals provided in
the second concurrent resolution. If only one committee is
directed to make such changes, the committee reports its
14
recommendations to its respective house in the form of a
reconciliation resolution or reconciliation bill. However, if
more than one committee is directed to make such changes,
these committees submit their recommendations to their
respective Budget Committees, which then compile the
recommendations, in the form of a bill or resolution, for
their respective house. Subject to a point of order, Congress
may not adjourn until action on the second concurrent budget
resolution, reconciliation bill or reconciliation resolution
is complete.
M. ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BUDGET COMMITTEES
There are several provisions in the legislation which are
subject to a point of order. Since it was the CBA of 1974
which created the Budget Committees, they would have the most
incentive to raise a point of order when a provision of the
legislation which empowered them was violated. Consequently,
the Budget Committees assume the additional responsibility of
enforcing the new process.
The CBA also specifies that it is the responsibility of
both the House and Senate Budget Committees to continually
evaluate the budget process and to make recommendations on the
ways in which the process may be improved or revised. The
legislation, however, does not preclude any other committees
from making similar recommendations.
15
N. IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL
The final section of the CBA of 1974, Title X, was written
to restrain the executive branch, as opposed to the previous
titles which were designed more to discipline Congress itself.
In fact, Title X may be regarded as a separate act under the
name of the. Impoundment Control Act of 1974. This last
section distinguishes between two different types of impound-
ments and expands on the aspects of each. Deferrals are
regarded as a delay of the obligation or expenditure of budget
authority. Rescissions are the cancellation of the obligation
or expenditure of budget authority. The executive branch has
the power to defer unless Congress disapproves, and to rescind
only with the consent of Congress.
On July 12, 1974, President Nixon signed the Congressional
Budget Act. The creation of the Budget Committees and the
requirement to produce two concurrent budget resolutions
provided a means by which Congress could determine and control
the appropriate level of revenues and expenditures and
establish budget priorities. The creation of the Congres-
sional Budget Office provided the means by which Congress
could obtain relevant information from the executive branch to
facilitate the congressional budget process. The Act estab-
lished strict guidelines to allow for control over executive
impoundments. Collectively, all of the provisions within the
legislation were designed to assure effective Congressional
control over the budget process.
16
While it attempted to accommodate all of the budget
participants, the CBA of 1974 required some redistribution of
power. The Appropriations Committees gained some control over
entitlements and backdoor spending at the expense of control
over total spending and spending within each of the individual
budget functions. The Revenue Committees gained a legislative
procedure which could control federal expenditure, while
conceding some authority over revenue totals. 7 But with the
creation of the Budget Committees, the CBA of 1974 created a
budget participant around which the rest of the process would
revolve. Budget participants reported to these new committees
at the beginning of the process, were obligated to work within
the resolutions, and accept their reconciliation instruction
at the end of the process. Further, acting as enforcers of
the new legislation, the Budget Committees would continuously
monitor new and existing legislation.
The success of the CBA would rely upon several considera-
tions. Inflation, unemployment and conflict with the execu-
tive branch were factors which contributed to the budget
reform sentiment in Congress. Therefore, the success of the
legislation would partially depend on the performance of the
economy, and the relationship between Congress and the
President.
However, the majority of the CBA was designed to organize
congressional budgeting. Therefore, its success and the
future of the Budget Committees would rely on the willingness
17
of the members of each chamber to support the legislation.
Resolutions and reconciliation instructions would be
inherently disagreeable to some members of Congress. The
value of a resolution relies, first and foremost, on the fact
that it is supported by a majority in Congress. Supporting
the process as a whole might require a member to relinquish
his individual legislative or committee interests.
Similarly, the Budget Committees, while potentially very
powerful, would be effective only to the extent that they were
able to anticipate and accommodate the budget preferences of
the other participants in the budget process.
18
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2. Howard Shuman, Politics and the Budget, The Struggle Between the
President and the Congress (Engelwood Cliffs NJ : Prentice Hall,
1988. ) , p. 197.
3. LeLoup, The Fiscal Congress , pp. 18-19.
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III. THE ROLE OF THE BUDGET COMMITTEES 1974-1980
A word frequently used to describe the first five years of
the new budget process and the Budget Committees established
by the CBA of 1974 is "accommodation." Accommodation in this
context describes the consideration and coordination of the
legislative needs and wants of all the committees centralized
through the CBA. Accommodation, however, does not necessarily
imply satisfying all of these needs, but weighing them against
each other, minimizing the dissatisfaction of the various
budget participants, and allowing the Budget Committees to
report resolutions which would be accepted by a majority on
the floor of their respective house.
Neither does accommodation imply that conflict was absent
from the budget process during the years which followed the
CBA of 1974. The potential for conflict is inherent in the
design of the federal government, and accordingly, this
potential extends through the budget process. Prior to the
CBA of 1974, budget conflict within the legislative branch
occurred primarily between the Appropriations, Authorizing,
and Revenue Committees. Since the CBA of 1974 created the
Budget Committees in addition to the existing structure of the
budget process, these new participants could only be expected
to increase the potential for conflict.
20
Budget resolutions forced conflict by juxtaposing
inherently controversial budget issues. Spending decisions
were considered collectively rather than on an individual
basis. Further, spending and revenue decisions and the
resulting deficit had to be addressed relative to each other
within a single legislative framework. Consequently, the
first five years of the new budget process were marked by
narrow margins on budget resolution votes (See Tables 3 and
4). In spite of the conflict, accommodation was the means by
which the Budget Committees and Congress ensured the preserva-
tion of the process.
A. HOUSE AND SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEES
The House Budget Committee exerted less of an influence
over the budget process during the first five years of the CBA
than their counterparts in the Senate. Loyalty and unity
within the House Budget Committee may have been undermined by
the requirement for direct representation on that committee by
the Appropriations and the Ways and Means Committees and party
leadership. This was further aggravated by the required
rotation of the committee members. Required rotation of the
membership of HBC also occurred at the expense of the
expertise a member gained during his tenure on the committee. 1
To compensate for the discord within the House Budget
Committee, Democrats within the committee relied on their
party leadership to generate the required support for a
resolution. The large margin by which the Democrats
21
controlled House facilitated the influence of party leader-
ship. Not coincidentally, House resolutions were perceived as
more representative of Democratic fiscal policy. 2 As shown
in Table 3 , votes on the passage of budget resolutions in the
House followed strong party lines.
TABLE 3




Resolutions Yes No Ye s No No
FY 1976
1st Resolution 230 193 225 55 5 138
2nd Resolution 225 191 214 67 11 124
FY 1977
1st Resolution 221 155 208 44 13 111
2nd Resolution 227 151 215 38 12 113
3rd Resolution 239 169 225 50 14 119
84 320 82 185 2 135
213 179 206 58 7 121
199 188 195 59 4 129
201 197 198 61 3 136














Source: Allen Schick, "The First Five Years of Congressional
Budgeting/' in The Congressional Budget Process after Five
Years, ed. Rudolph G. Penner (Washington D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981), p. 10.
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192 213 188 67 4 146
212 206 212 52 154
As shown in Table 4, votes on the passage of the Senate
budget resolution were less partisan. As opposed to the
TABLE 4






Resolutions Yes No Yes N
FY 1976
1st Resolution 69 22 50
2nd Resolution 69 23 50
FY 1977
1st Resolution 62 22 45
2nd Resolution 55 23 41
3rd Resolution 72 20 55
FY 1978
1st Resolution 56 31 41
2nd Resolution 63 21 46
FY 1979
1st Resolution 64 27 48
2nd Resolution 56 18 42
FY 1980
1st Resolution 64 20 44





















Source: Allen Schick, "The First Five Years of Congressional
Budgeting," in The Congressional Budget Process after Five
Years, ed. Rudolph G. Penner (Washington D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981), p. 17.
House, the Democrats maintained a smaller majority in the
Senate, and therefore the influence of the party leadership
was reduced. Senators, with longer terms and broader
constituencies, may not have felt as threatened by the
statements which resolutions would force them to make. 3 There
was no CBA requirement for representation of other committees
23
on the Senate Budget Committee. Further, the absence of a
time limit on membership on the SBC allowed Senators to
develop expertise and a sense of loyalty toward the committee.
B. PARTISAN CONFLICT
Partisan conflict was evident from the start of the new
budget process. Although the CBA of 1974 did not require the
production of a resolution until the following year, the HBC
and SBC agreed to produce resolutions for FY 1976. Fiscal
conservatives were immediately opposed to supporting the
process which would force them, for the first time, to go on
record in favor of a $70 billion deficit. 4 Congressman
Delbert Latta, the ranking minority member of the HBC, voiced
this opposition to the resolution.
We will have acquired by fiscal year 1976 $600 billion
plus in debt since the beginning of our history but we are
going to acquire one sixth of that in one single year.
That is scary. ... We are passing this tremendous debt
onto our children and their children. I think that is
downright immoral. 5
The divergence on the HBC may have undermined the process and
the credibility of the committee in the House, contributing to
the narrow vote margins of the first resolutions.
In the Senate, Senator Muskie, chairman of the SBC, and
the ranking minority member, Senator Bellman, worked together
to avoid the kind of partisan conflict that threatened the
process in the House. The leadership in the SBC realized that
the best hope for the new process was to report resolutions
which the members of the Budget Committee, both Republican and
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Democrat, would support on the floor. As Senator Muskie
stated:
There is no point in sending something that is fruitless
to the Floor. If we send something to the Floor and end
up with 15 members of the Committee for one reason or
another deciding that they can't support it, we are really
going to be in a tough box. 6
In contrast to the House, partisan accommodation in the Senate
began first within the Budget Committee where it was easier to
resolve partisan disputes among 15 committee members than on
the floor of the chamber.
C. ACCOMMODATING THE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES
In developing resolutions, the Budget Committees must be
cautious not to appear to intrude too far into the jurisdic-
tion of the other budget participants. Deciding the totals
for various functional categories, Budget Committee members
must make some assumption about which programs will be
financed and for how much. At the same time, however, they
risk incensing the Appropriations Committees whose responsi-
bility it is to decide program financing at a more detailed
level
.
In order to ensure the future of the process, the Budget
Committees took efforts to accommodate the powerful Appropria-
tions Committees during the first five years of the budget
process. An example of this occurred during the conference on
the third resolution for fiscal year 1977, when Congressman
Robert Giamo interrupted the conference to propose that
spending levels be revised: "I am told the Appropriations
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Committee has just marked up some numbers that might be of
some interest here." 7 Although the levels were revised to
reflect those provided by the Appropriations Committee, this
accommodation frustrated other Budget Committee members in the
conference such as Senator Peter Domenici who responded:
"What are we doing here marking up these functions if we are
just waiting for Appropriations to give us the figures?" 8
Accommodation of this sort led critics of the process to
regard the Budget Committees as little more than adding
machines.
While one of the purposes of the CBA was to allow control
over budget totals and relative priorities, it was standard
procedure in both the House and Senate during the markup of a
resolution to consider functions individually, leaving budget
totals and relative proportions to be a result. As Senator
Muskie stated:
(The committee goes) through each of the 19 functions of
the budget carefully, without carrying any total target
for spending. . . . Each function's total and, indeed, the
missions within each function, are addressed in that
fashion. There is no arbitrary ceiling imposed on
domestic spending. There is an honest attempt to address
legitimate needs in each function. 9
Rep. Robert Giamo of the House Budget Committee defended this
approach, stating:
. . . if we attempt to set overall budget limits without
going into the specific functional categories and taking
into account the programs and activities which may be
funded, we will be proceeding into a factual vacuum . . .
there is no way for us to know what the implications of
such a procedure would be for various programs. 10
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These examples are not intended to portray the Budget
Committees as weak or ineffective during the first five years
of the budget process. In order to prevent the process from
falling by the wayside, the Budget Committees had to
continuously monitor and accommodate the legislative interests
of the participants. Once Congress became acclimated to the
presence of the Budget Committees, they would be more effec-
tive in influencing policy.
One example of what could have happened if the Budget
Committees had taken a more aggressive and independent role
occurred in May 1977. Despite the objections of the chairman
of the Budget Committee, Senator Muskie, the Senate had
approved a farm crop support program which would violate the
targets set in the first resolution, passed only weeks
earlier. When the Senate Budget Committee reported the second
resolution, it included reconciliation instructions to
eliminate $700 million from the crop supports. On the floor,
the Senate simply eliminated the reconciliation instructions
from the resolution, and increased the level of funding for
agriculture. 11
As the Budget Committees had to accommodate the Appropria-
tions Committees, the reverse was also true as the Appropria-
tions Committee realized they must concede their traditional
role as "guardians of the purse." An example of this occurred
in 1977 after Congress had passed a third resolution in
support of President Carter's economic stimulus program.
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Subsequent to the resolution, the House Appropriations
Committee reported a supplemental appropriations bill with
spending levels sharply below those outlined in the third
resolution. In response to protests from the Chairman of the
House Budget Committee, Democratic leadership in the House
compelled the Chairmen of the Appropriations Committee and
subcommittees to sponsor amendments which increased the
supplemental appropriations bill by $700 million dollars when
it reached the floor. 12
D. ACCOMMODATING THE REVENUE COMMITTEES
While the Budget Committees have some influence in the
distribution of federal expenditures by allocating among the
various budget functions, they are much more limited in their
influence over revenues. The CBA did not relate revenue
legislation to the budget resolution as the budget timetable
did with appropriations bills. Revenue legislation may be
considered throughout the year and the effects of it are more
difficult to estimate than appropriations. Further, resolu-
tions do not provide a means by which the Budget Committees
can specify much more than revenue totals, with the decision
of how much of the tax burden should be borne by which part of
society left to the House Ways and means and the Senate
Finance committees.
Conflict between the Budget and Revenue Committees became
apparent early in the new budget process. Senate Budget
Committee Chairman Muskie and Senate Finance Committee
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Chairman Long engaged in one of the more notorious confronta-
tions shortly after the Senate approved the first resolution
for fiscal year 1977. The Senate Finance Committee had
reported a tax bill which met the revenue totals of the first
resolution by manipulating the effective dates of temporary
tax cuts and tax expenditures. Senator Muskie argued that the
bill was a threat to the fiscal policy of the Budget
Resolution and that it ultimately would result in revenue
losses in the out-years. Senator Long contended that the tax
reform bill offered by his committee complied with the guide-
lines of the second resolution, and that the Budget Committees
would be impinging on the jurisdiction of his committee if
they attempted to specify anything more than revenue totals.
Although most Senators recognized that Senator Muskie was
correct, the floor voted in favor of the tax bill. In arguing
his point, Senator Long had emphasized the importance of
committee jurisdiction, and this may have persuaded Senators,
recognizing the threat to their own committees, to support the
Finance Committee. 13
Although this direct confrontation between Budget and
Finance Committees may not appear to be accommodating in
itself, Senator Muskie's challenge of the Finance Committee
may be seen as an accommodation of the tax reform sentiment in
Congress. The tax reform bill which ultimately emerged from
conference offered measures which complied more closely with
the revenue totals of the budget resolution. 14 Further,
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allowing the Finance Committee to circumvent the budget
resolutions through accounting gimmicks set a dangerous
precedent which would threaten the future of the process.
Two years later Senators Muskie and Long had apparently
reached a mutual understanding. In order to avoid the
conflict of previous years they had developed an agreement
whereby the SBC would allow Senator Long's Finance Committee
room for a moderate amount of tax reduction in the markup of
the second resolution for fiscal year 1979. In return,
Senator Long assured that the tax bill being considered
(ultimately the Revenue Act of 1978) , would be consistent with
the levels specified in the second resolution. In contrast to
their heated conflict two years prior, during the floor debate
of the tax bill Senator Long supported Senator Muskie as he
voiced opposition to various floor amendments which would
increase the size of the tax reductions. 15
After five years of congressional budgeting, many of the
problems which had led up to the CBA still remained. The
economy was still struggling with inflation and unemployment
(see Table 5)
.
Some felt that the CBA implied the promise of deficit
reduction and spending control. Yet deficit spending had been
used in each of the resolutions produced during the five year
period. Federal spending had continued to increase from $332









Economic Indicators and Budget Deficits/Surplus
Consumer Price Unemployment Deficit
or Surplus







Source: John Cranford, Budgeting for America (Washington
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989), pp. 6, 44, and 52.
Uncontrollable spending had increased over the same period
from 72.8 percent to 76.1 percent of total expenditures. 17
Although it was anticipated that Congress would use the
new process to gain control over these areas, there was no
stipulation in the CBA which stated that deficit and spending
reduction/control would be achieved.
These figures and previous examples may indicate that the
Budget Committees were marginally effective in influencing
budget policy during the first five years, while the Appro-
priations and Revenue Committees retained their traditional
influence. But, while they may have been less effective than
anticipated in influencing policy, the Budget Committees did
have a significant impact on the process. During these five
years, the Budget Committees had established themselves within
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the infrastructure of Congress. Formulating budget resolu-
tions had become an accepted annual evolution. Through
accommodation they had ensured that the new process survived
and at the beginning of the 1980' s they were in a position to
take a more aggressive role in the congressional budget
process.
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IV. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETING AND THE
ROLE OF THE BUDGET COMMITTEES 1981-1984
The elections of 1980 set the stage for what was to be one
of the most potent uses of the provisions of the CBA - recon-
ciliation. Benefiting from the momentum of Reagan's popular-
ity and his defeat of President Carter, the Republicans gained
control of the Senate with a net increase of 12 seats for a 53
to 47 majority. While the Democrats still maintained control
of the House with a margin of 242 to 193, the Republicans had
gained thirty-three seats. This Republican House minority,
joined by a group of conservative southern Democrats known as
the "Boll Weevils," would facilitate the use of reconciliation
in support of Reagan's fiscal policy.
Reconciliation had been used for the first time in 1980,
but not to the extent it would be the following year. The
1980 reconciliation bill contained $4.6 billion in spending
cuts and $3.6 billion in revenue increases, a change of less
than 1 percent from the spending and revenue totals. 1
A. BUDGETING IN 1981
Reagan assumed the executive office with a specific
economic program which included a substantial reduction in
government spending with a marked shift in resources from
domestic programs to defense, and a significant reduction in
federal taxes. 2 During the first weeks of the Reagan
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Presidency, the White House, specifically Reagan's Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, David Stockman, and
Senate Republican leadership initiated an effort to modify
President Carter's budget request for FY 1982 to accommodate
Reagan's economic program. President Reagan formally
submitted his budget revisions to Congress on March 10, 1981.
Within two weeks, the Senate Budget Committee under the new
leadership of Senator Peter Domenici, who had ascended to the
chairmanship when the Republicans gained control of the
Senate, had reported a resolution revising the second budget
resolution for fiscal year 1981. This resolution contained
reconciliation instructions to fourteen Senate committees to
cut spending by $36.4 billion for FY 1982. 3 After numerous
floor amendments by the Democratic minority to restore spend-
ing were rejected, the Senate approved the resolution by a
vote of 80 to 10. Ultimately, the reconciliation instruc-
tions were incorporated into the first concurrent resolution
for FY 1982 which was approved by the Senate on May 12, 1981.
Of particular note, however, is the composition of these
spending reductions. Only $3.2 billion of the cuts were
directed toward the appropriations committee, with 90 percent
of the cuts consisting of previously funded authorizations and
entitlements. 4 This is significant in that it demonstrates
that, aside from the ability to radically alter fiscal policy,
reconciliation had enormous legislative implications.
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In the Democrat controlled House, the Budget Committee
opted to consider reconciliation with the mark up of the first
resolution for FY 1982. The resolution reported to the House
by the Budget Committee attempted to dilute the Reagan
economic program, increasing spending and tax receipts.
During the floor debate, however, the Budget Committee's
resolution was rejected in favor of a proposal constructed by
conservative Democrat Phil Gramm, the only Democrat on the HBC
to vote against the resolution in committee, and Delbert
Latta, the ranking Republican member of the HBC. The Gramm-
Latta substitute resolution differed from Reagan's budget
request only in further reducing spending by $6.1 billion,
thereby reducing the deficit an equal amount. 5 The floor vote
on the Gramm-Latta substitute was 253 to 176 with 63
conservative "Boll Weevil" Democrats siding with a unified
Republican minority.
This conservative majority in the House was to again exert
its influence after the first resolution had been agreed to in
conference and the Budget Committees had assembled and
reported their reconciliation bills. While the Senate recon-
ciliation bill was accepted with little difficulty, in the
House the Democrat authored reconciliation bill deviated too
much from the intentions of the Reagan administration,
prompting Gramm-Latta II. Gramm-Latta II, a Republican/Boll
Weevil reconciliation alternative which closely approximated
the Senate bill, was agreed to in the House by a vote of 217-
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211. The final reconciliation bill, reducing spending by
$35.2 billion for FY 1982 and $130.6 billion through FY 1981-
1984, was agreed to in conference on July 29, 1981 and adopted
by each house two days later. 6 On August 13, 1981, less than
six months after its inception, President Reagan signed the
Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1981 into law.
B. TREND TOWARD MAJORITARIAM BUDGETING
There are several factors which contributed to the success
of Reagan's fiscal program in 1981. Reconciliation had only
been used once before and not to the extent which it was used
in 1981 to influence fiscal policy. Reconciliation, as it was
designed, was to be the means by which non-binding budget
totals in the first budget resolution could be brought into
accord with the second resolution. However, the original
budget timetable provided only ten days after adopting the
second budget resolution to complete action on a reconcilia-
tion bill. Further, reconciliation required changes to
legislation regarding controversial budget topics such as
entitlements. These factors made reconciliation an
impractical procedure as it was originally conceived. 7
The Reagan administration used reconciliation in a much
different capacity. By including reconciliation instructions
with the first budget resolution, reconciliation became a
means to radically influence fiscal policy. The speed with
which budget resolutions and the reconciliation bills were
executed allowed administration supporters to capitalize on
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Reagan's popularity, and prevent lobbyists and other
coalitions from organizing an opposition. Finally, the most
obvious factor which ensured the success of Reagan's fiscal
program was the majority support of the Republican/Boll Weevil
Coalition in Congress.
While perhaps unanticipated, the budget process created by
the CBA of 1974 would contribute toward the formation of
larger coalitions and an increased role for party leadership
in the budget process. 8 By unifying the previously frag-
mented appropriations process with revenues, programs took on
an added significance with respect to their impact on fiscal
policy. Subsequently, increasingly diverse interests were
drawn into the budget process. But, as Allen Schick states,
"Because a budget resolution addresses the interests of most
committees and members, it cannot be composed by the Budget
Committees alone." 9
This sentiment is supported by John Gilmour who states in
Reconcilable Differences , "broader policies - such as reducing
deficits, restraining spending, and enacting consistent fiscal
policy - are not well served by a committee system." 10 The
budget resolutions and reconciliation instructions with the
significance of those in 1981, by intruding into the legis-
lative prerogatives of other committees, could only reinforce
the trend toward majoritarian budgeting. 11
Throughout 1981, the perception of the Budget Committee's
power and stature was enhanced because of the new significance
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of budget resolutions and reconciliation instructions. This
was particularly true in the Senate, due to the close alliance
between SBC Chairman Peter Domenici and the Reagan administra-
tion. According to Senator Domenici, reconciliation was
regarded by Congress as an "extension of the normal proce-
dures." 12
However, the extent to which reconciliation was used to
impact fiscal and legislative policy would force it to become
normal procedure. In subsequent years, budget resolutions and
reconciliation instructions would be bargained for by the
various claimants of the budget process. Once its potential
was realized none of these claimants would allow the budget
process to remain within the prerogative of one set of
committees. While the power of the Budget Committees related
directly to the impact of budget resolutions and reconcilia-
tion instructions, ensuring congressional acceptance of these
significant budget measures would require the formation of
larger coalitions, ultimately detracting from the influence of
the Budget Committees. Subsequently the following decade
would be marked by the influence of larger coalitions and
budget summits as congressional party leadership and the
administration would decide the details of budget resolutions
and reconciliation instructions.
C. BUDGET SUMMITRY IN 1982
By the start of the 1982 (FY 1983) budget cycle, the
circumstances which had allowed the radical use of
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reconciliation to push through Reagan's economic program had
changed. The economy had not responded as quickly as
predicted by the administration. Unemployment at the start of
1982 was 8.9 percent, its highest level since 1975. 13 Real
Gross National Product had declined by a 5.2 percent annual
rate for the last quarter of 1981. u In light of these
economic factors and projections of a $100 billion deficit,
members of the coalition who had supported Reagan's economic
program the previous year began to abandon it.
Even prior to the submission of the executive budget,
members of Congress, both Republican and Democrat, began to
recognize and advocate the need for summitry in the budget
process. As SBC chairman Peter Domenici stated at a confer-
ence on the budget process in early 1982:
If the president is not able to muster popular support, as
he did last year, then a truly bipartisan approach to the
first budget resolution, even if it differs substantially
from the president's plan is absolutely imperative. 15
At the same conference, House Majority Leader and member
of the House Budget Committee, Jim Wright noted the animosity
which the rest of Congress felt toward the Budget Committees
stating:
The danger to the continuation of budget process is the
perception on the part of the standing committees of the
House that we are trying to supplant them, ... I see an
enormous dissatisfaction moving like an undertow and
beginning to clutch at the process. 16
Yet at the same time, Wright advocated summitry, which
ultimately would undermine the role of the Budget Committee in
the budget process, stating: "We would be more than pleased
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to sit down with him (Reagan) and seek avenues of agreement
toward our mutual goal." 17
With the submission of the President's budget with a
deficit of $91.5 billion for FY 1983, leaders from both
parties acknowledged that Reagan's budget would be rejected in
its present form, and the need for a budget summit to facili-
tate a compromise. 18
The budget summit occurred throughout the month of April,
with representatives from Congress and the Administration
negotiating on behalf of President Reagan and Speaker of the
House Thomas O'Neill. Ultimately, President Reagan and
Speaker of the House O'Neill would meet on the final day of
the summit to try (unsuccessfully) to resolve their partisan
conflicts. While they were participants throughout most of
the summit, SBC Chairman Peter Domenici and HBC Chairman James
Jones were conspicuously not included in these final
discussions. 19
Following the breakdown in summit negotiations the Budget
committees drafted their own resolutions. In the Senate, the
Budget Committee reported a resolution which called for tax
increases and cuts in social security although the total
spending cuts were less than requested by President Reagan.
After several days of floor debate, party leadership realized
the resolution reported by the SBC would not be accepted by
the floor. As a result, Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker
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called for a recess so the Republicans could caucus and
rewrite the resolution. 20
In the House, the initial resolution was reported to the
floor without support from HBC Republicans. The resolution
was voted down on the floor along with several alternatives.
Ultimately, a HBC alternative, which essentially mirrored the
President's request, would be adopted with the support of the
Republican/Boll Weevil coalition. 21
D. BUDGETING IN 1983
A budget summit was avoided in 1983 (FY 1984), however
that year's budget process was still dominated by larger
budget coalitions. In the 1982 elections, House Democrats had
gained 26 seats allowing greater solidarity within the party.
Even prior to the mark up of the first resolution House
Speaker Thomas O'Neill announced a Democratic caucus to take
place in early March to "address the current economic and
budget challenge." 22 Following the caucus, the unified
Democrat coalition allowed the HBC to report a budget
resolution which ultimately was accepted by the House on March
23.
The SBC, however, was unable to design a resolution which
was able to generate enough support within the committee to
report to the floor. The primary impasse within the SBC had
been a consensus on tax revenues with the Democrats on the SBC
calling for a $30 billion increase in new taxes. In deference
to the process, SBC Chairman Peter Domenici and three other
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Republican members of the SBC, conceded to a Democrat proposed
resolution. 23 While the Republicans on the SBC continued to
oppose the revenue figures, the resolution was reported with
the intention of revising the resolution on the floor. 24
While this maintained the continuity of the process, it may
have further undermined the Budget Committee's role in the
process, allowing larger coalitions to design as well as
revise the budget resolution.
On the floor, the Republican party remained divided as
five moderate Republicans joined with the Democratic minority
to accept an alternative resolution providing for higher
taxes, lower defense spending and a smaller deficit than the
executive budget request or a Republican alternative sponsored
by SBC Chairman Domenici and Majority Leader Howard Baker.
The Republican party remained divided throughout the confer-
ence and the subsequent adoption of the conference resolution
by both houses. Senate Finance Committee Chairman Robert Dole
regarded the three year $73 billion tax increase called for by
the conference resolution as "unbalanced and unworkable" and
called for a budget summit to redress the resolution. 25
Throughout the remainder of the year, Congress would argue the
composition of a reconciliation bill to meet the requirements
of the budget resolution and eventually adjourn for the year
without one.
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E. BUDGET SUMMITRY IN 1984
President Reagan again called for a budget summit in 1984
to avoid the conflict which had marked the two previous budget
cycles. 26 Despite the President's request to negotiate a
deficit reduction plan, Democrats in both Houses maintained
that any deficit reduction would be accomplished through the
"normal" legislative process. 27
The White House reached an accord with the Republican
Senate contingent in mid March. Termed the "Rose Garden"
plan, as the President endorsed it in the White House Rose
Garden, the plan called for caps limiting defense and other
discretionary spending and an increase in taxes.
With Congress being limited by an election year schedule,
and the large federal deficits becoming a key election issue,
both houses took action early in the year to pass legislation
which would have a significant impact on the federal deficit.
The House took the traditional budget approach, passing a
budget resolution followed by a separate revenue and spending
bills, requiring an increase in taxes of $49.8 billion and
spending cuts of $132.6 billion through FY 1987. 28 Alter-
nately, the Senate delayed consideration of a budget resolu-
tion until they had resolved the details of a deficit
reduction package, essentially resolving reconciliation
instructions prior to the resolution, reversing the order of
the budget process as it is outlined in the CBA. The Senate
deficit reduction package included $47.7 billion in tax
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increases and $92.6 billion in spending cuts through FY
1987. w The Senate budget resolution was adopted the day
following the adoption of the deficit reduction package. An
indication of the diminishing role which the Budget committees
played during the 1984 budget evolution was during the confer-
ence on the deficit reduction package. The conference
included more than 120 Senators and Representatives, divided
among twelve sub-groups which made up the conference. The
Budget Committees were simultaneously in conference for the
budget resolution with the responsibility of assisting the
twelve sub-groups to assemble their decisions into a
conference report. 30
While the details of the deficit reduction package were
resolved in conference by the summer recess, the conference on
the budget resolution remained unresolved over the issue of
defense spending. A second summit required to resolve the
differences between the Reagan administration and Congress on
defense spending was concluded after two weeks on September
20. 31 This last obstacle finally allowed Congress to adopt
a budget resolution on October 1, just in time for the start
of the fiscal year.
Summitry and the influence of party leadership would
continue to dominate the budget process and diminish the
influence of the Budget Committees through the remainder of
the decade. However, the summitry of 1985 would result in
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legislation which would further compound the budget process,
and diminish the role of the Budget Committees.
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V. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETING AND THE
ROLE OF THE BUDGET COMMITTEE8 1985 - 1989
A. BUDGETING AND BETRAYAL IN 1985
The contents of the Reagan budget for 198 6 had been known
for several weeks before it was submitted to Congress on
February 4, 1985. Its features included revenues of $793.7
billion, outlays of $973.7 billion and a deficit of $180
billion. 1 However, even prior to the submission of the
executive budget, Congress, frustrated with the growing
deficit, had begun fashioning a budget alternative for FY
1986.
Congressional Democrats, while rejecting the Reagan
budget, allowed Congressional Republicans to take the
initiative in formulating an alternative. Throughout the
first months of 1985 Senate Republicans under the leadership
of the newly elected majority leader, Robert Dole, and the
Chairman of the SBC, Pete Domenici, proposed at least five
budget variations which would be acceptable to both Congress
and the administration. 2
The budget resolution which was finally accepted by the
Senate provided for defense spending to increase at the rate
of inflation, a freeze in the cost-of-living adjustment (COLA)
on Social Security and other retirement benefits, and substan-
tial cuts in domestic programs, allowing for lower deficits
than originally proposed by the administration. Opposition
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to the resolution on the floor of the Senate required that
Republican Senator Pete Wilson, who was recuperating from
surgery, be wheeled in on a stretcher to cast the tie vote,
with Vice President George Bush casting the deciding vote in
favor of the Senate budget resolution.
The House, in response to the deficit reduction in the
Senate resolution, quickly moved to pass a resolution which
matched the savings of the Senate package. The Democrat-
authored House resolution, however, retained the COLA for
Social Security, provided less spending for defense and more
for domestic programs.
When the conference committee on the budget resolution
remained at an impasse over the partisan differences between
the House and Senate resolutions, President Reagan made an
agreement with House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill to accept the
COLA for Social Security in exchange for the House's
acceptance of the inflation adjustment for defense spending.
By previously exercising the vote of the Vice President,
the administration had essentially conferred its support for
the Senate resolution with its freeze on COLAs. With the
accord reached between Reagan and O'Neill, the President had
abandoned the Senate Republicans. While the agreement did not
immediately resolve the differences of the conferees, the
budget resolution adopted by Congress was considered much
closer to the House budget resolution, without meeting
anyone's expectations for deficit reduction. 3 In the words
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of SBC Chairman Pete Domenici, "Any chance for this year of
getting a real, significant, reliable, credible deficit
reduction package is gone." 4 The deficit projected by the
final resolution for FY 1986 was $171.9 billion, revised in
October 1986 to $220.7 billion. 5
B. GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS
The frustration the Senate Republicans felt with the
inability to reduce the deficit, and their betrayal by
President Reagan contributed to the sentiment to amend the
budget process and force deficit reduction. Late in the summer,
the Senate took advantage of a bill to increase the ceiling on
the national debt as a vehicle for the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. The legislation is
more commonly known by the names of the sponsors of the
measure, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH)
.
GRH was a complex deficit reduction package, revising the
budget process in a number of ways. The budget timetable
outlined in the CBA was changed to move most of the budget
deadlines earlier in the year (see Table 6) . The second
budget resolution, which held little significance by 1985, was
formally eliminated.
The deficit reduction portion of GRH centered around the
new budget timetables. Each August 15 through 1990 the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) would take a deficit "snapshot," their projection
of the federal deficit relative to the actions Congress had
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taken to date and the most recent economic forecasts. 6 The
reports of the two offices would be assessed by the Comp-
troller General of the General Accounting Office (GAO) and his
report would be forwarded to the President.
GRH legislated the maximum deficit, which was to decrease
each fiscal year until, by FY 1991, the budget would be
balanced (see Table 7) . Should the deficit projections in the
GAO report to the President exceed the maximum amount allowed
in the legislation (with a $10 billion margin for error) , the
President would issue a sequester order, effective at the
start of the fiscal year, automatically cutting spending for
eligible programs.
Programs exempt from sequestration included the following:
social security, interest on the federal debt, veterans'
compensation and pensions, Medicaid, WIC (a food program for
women and children) , Supplemental Income, food stamps, and
child nutrition, with limited cuts for five health programs
including Medicare. 7 Of the eligible programs, the spending
cuts would be equally divided between defense and non-defense
accounts. OMB and CBO would submit a revised report to the
GAO on October 5, to allow for Congressional action which
would meet the deficit totals. The GAO subsequently reports
to the President and the final sequestration order would take
effect on October 15.
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C. IMPACT OF GRH ON THE BUDGET COMMITTEES
Gramm-Rudman-Hol lings continued to reduce the influence of
the Budget Committees. The legislation had been intended to
force a compromise between the larger coalitions in order to
avoid the automatic cuts of a sequester. However, by legis-
lating deficit totals, GRH had specifically limited the
prerogatives of the various budget participants throughout the
duration of GRH.
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 specifies that the
concurrent budget resolution, first submitted to Congress by
the House and Senate Budget Committees, should set forth "the
amount, if any, of the surplus or the deficit in the budget
which is appropriate in light of economic conditions and all
other relevant factors." 8 With this portion of the budget
resolution decided by GRH, all of the budget participants had
been constrained. But, because the most significant product
of the Budget Committees each year was the budget resolution,
the legislation of deficit totals restricted their sphere of
influence more than any other participant in the budget
process. Gramm-Rudman-Hol lings also specified that recon-
ciliation instructions would be included with the first, and
as a result of GRH, the only budget resolution. However, in
issuing reconciliation instructions, the Budget Committees'
influence was also restricted. The committees with jurisdic-
tion over the numerous entitlement programs exempted from the
threat of sequestration would have less incentive to conform
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TABLE 6
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET TIMETABLE REVISED BY GRH












President submits his budget.
Congressional Budget Office submits
report to Budget Committees.
Committees submit views and estimates to
Budget Committees.
Senate Budget Committee reports
concurrent resolution on the budget.
Congress completes action on concurrent
resolution on the budget.
Annual appropriations bills may be
considered in the House.
House Appropriations Committee reports
last annual appropriations bill.
Congress completes action on
reconciliation legislation.
House completes action on annual
appropriation bills.
Fiscal year begins.
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Source: U.S., Statutes at Large , Vol. 99.
with reconciliation instructions, as failure to comply would
result in a sequester of the discretionary portion of the
budget.
D. BUDGETING IN 198 6
Participants began budgeting for 1986 (FY 1987) under the
constraints of GRH. Yet from its inception, there were
questions about the constitutionality of the legislation. The
dispute centered on the GAO's report to the President,
initiating the sequester process. Because the Comptroller
General, the head of the GAO, could be removed from his
position by Congress, the GAO was perceived as an agent of the
legislative branch. Therefore, the legislative branch would
have intruded into an executive function by initiating a
sequester. On February 7, a special three-judge federal panel
ruled that GRH violated the separation of powers between the
legislative and executive branches. 9 However, the provisions
55
of GRH would remain in effect until the Supreme Court would
rule on the issue later in the summer.
While Congress was able to ensure the passage of GRH by
the recess at the end of the previous year, they had adjourned
without passing a reconciliation bill. Since GRH had been
adopted midway through the fiscal year, a special budget
timetable was included in the legislation to reduce the
deficit by a maximum of $11.7 billion for the remainder of
that fiscal year. Although GRH was intended to force
compromise, in their first opportunity to do so, Congress
opted for the automatic cuts, which were initiated on March 1
pending the Supreme Court's ruling. 10
With 1986 an election year, budget coalitions shifted from
the partisan conflict of the previous cycle to a bipartisan
Congress versus the administration. Senate Republicans and
Democrats publicly demonstrated that neither party would
support Reagan's budget with its emphasis on defense and
reduced domestic programs. In a letter circulated by Senator
Rudy Boschwitz, 37 Republicans and 13 Democrats urged the
President's cooperation in reducing the deficit and avoiding
the automatic spending cuts of GRH. 11
In the House the President's budget was defeated by a vote
of 12-312. However, Chairman of the House Budget Committee
William Gray stated that the HBC would allow the Senate to
take the lead and begin marking up a resolution after one had
emerged from the Senate. 12
56
On May 1 the Senate approved a $1.1 trillion dollar budget
resolution which reduced the president's defense request and
increased taxes while still meeting the GRH deficit target for
FY 1987. This was a decided shift from previous years when
there was a strong coalition among Senate Republicans to
support Reagan's defense build up and oppose new taxes. It
may have occurred as a result of Reagan's abandonment of the
Senate Republicans the previous summer. The House followed
with a resolution which further reduced the deficit through
lower defense spending and increased revenues.
The conference on the budget resolution lasted less than
two weeks. Despite having missed the deadline for completing
action on the budget resolution, Congress adopted a bipartisan
budget resolution on June 26. The resolution called for
$995.0 billion in spending, $852.4 billion in revenues, and a
resulting deficit of $142.6 billion. 13
On July 7, the supreme court upheld the lower court ruling
that GRH violated the separation of powers between the legis-
lative and executive branch, and nullified the first automatic
cuts of $11.7 billion. In response, both chambers passed
resolutions reaffirming the spending cuts.
A provision in GRH also provided a contingency, should the
measure be found unconstitutional, whereby the CBO and OMB
reports would be submitted to a special joint Budget Commit-
tee, which would report the cuts unchanged and immune to fili-
busters or amendments to the floor. 14
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However, Congress never had to resort to sequestration for
FY 1987, as a $12 billion reconciliation bill was passed to
meet the deficit target. The bill relied heavily on account-
ing gimmicks and one time savings such as a shift in military
pay dates, unanticipated revenues from the Tax Reform Act of
1986, and the sale of government assets. Many in Congress,
such as Senator William Armstrong, felt frustrated with the
circumvention of the process, regarding the bill as "a joke"
and stating: "This has nothing to do with trimming federal
spending." 15 While the target for FY 1987 was met, the means
by which it was accomplished left unanswered the question of
how the deficit would be reduced the following year.
E. BUDGETING IN 1987-88
Fiscal year 1988 began with President Reagan submitting a
budget which met the GRH deficit target of $107.8 billion. 16
Both houses of Congress were now controlled by the Democrats,
the Republicans having lost the Senate in the previous year's
elections. Democratic leaders were immediately critical of
the President's budget, stating it was "devoid of useful
ideas," with too much spending for defense, not enough for
domestic programs, and relying on one-time revenue savings to
reduce the deficit instead of new taxes. 17
With a majority in both houses, Democratic leaders planned
to rely on party unity to construct a broad Democratic budget
resolution which would quickly move through both chambers
simultaneously, with only minor differences to resolve in
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conference. 18 As Representative Martin Frost, a senior
Democrat on the House Budget Committee stated, "We will have
a budget on the floor of the House in early April; that
doesn't mean that it'll be a realistic budget, or that it will
pass." 19 This statement possibly indicates the regard with
which Budget Committee resolutions were held. These budget
resolutions were needed only to initiate the process. Whether
the resolution reported was realistic was of little concern,
as the substance of the resolution was ultimately decided by
larger coalitions, or deferred to the sequester of GRH.
The HBC approved a budget resolution for FY 1988 on a
party-line vote of 21-14 on April 1. The resolution passed
the floor of the House on April 9, by a vote of 230-192, with
no Republican support. Rather than use the economic assump-
tions projected by the CBO, however, the House budget resolu-
tion achieved the GRH deficit target by adopting the more
optimistic projections of the OMB.
The process was essentially the same in the Senate, which
approved a Democrat-authored budget resolution by a partyline
vote. The Senate resolution similarly adopted OMB economic
assumptions to avoid a GRH point of order prohibiting the
debate of budget resolutions which exceed the deficit targets
unless waived by a 60 vote majority.
Despite a majority in both houses, the Democrats were
divided in conference. The primary disagreement was defense,
conservative Senate Democrats wanting higher defense funding
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than the more liberal Democrats in the House. Again the
Budget Committees were circumvented, when after initial
conference discussions, the conferees adjourned for one month
while Democratic leaders from the House and Senate resolved
their differences. Only when the leadership had reached an
agreement did the conferees reconvene to approve the
measure. 20
Frustrated with the process, members of the Budget
Committees, primarily Senators Chiles, Domenici, and Gramm,
worked throughout the summer of 1987 to produce another budget
reform measure. Again, a bill raising the public debt limit
was used as the vehicle. President Reagan signed the bill,
formally known as the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, in late September.
More commonly known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings II (GRH II)
,
the measure essentially revived the automatic spending cut
procedures of the original GRH, and revised the deficit
targets (see Table 8). Under GRH II, the OMB would replace
the GAO as the agency issuing the sequester report to the
president. The maximum deficit reduction for FY 1988 was $23
billion. Under a slightly modified budget timetable, the
initial sequester report from the OMB was issued on October 20
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F. MARKET CRASH AND A TWO YEAR BUDGET DEAL
There were numerous factors which contributed to the stock
market crash on October 19, 1987. However, the crash was seen
by Congress and the administration as an indication of the
instability of the economy, and a demonstration of the
diminished confidence the financial community had in the
federal budget process, particularly since it occurred the day
before the initial sequester report. In light of the
situation, President Reagan conceded to a budget summit.
Negotiations continued for several weeks. Congressional
negotiators included the chairmen and ranking minority members
of the House and Senate Budget, Appropriations, and Revenue
Committees, the House Republican Whip, Trent Lott, and House
Majority Leader Thomas Foley. 21 However, while members of
the summit announced an agreement on November 20, they had not
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yet produced the savings necessary to preclude the sequester
required by GRH II.
The budget summit agreement was comprised of a package of
revenue increases and spending cuts extending over two years.
Cuts were specified for both defense and non-defense discre-
tionary appropriations, as well as reductions in certain
entitlement programs such as Medicare and farm price
supports. 22 Complying with the budget summit agreement,
Congress produced two pieces of legislation, a reconciliation
bill and a continuing appropriations resolution which also
repealed the sequester. Together these two pieces of
legislation purported to reduce the deficit by $33.4 billion
in 1988 and $42.7 billion in 1989. 23
While the ranking and minority members of the House and
Senate Budget Committees had participated in the budget
summit, the agreement continued to diminish the impact of the
Budget Committees. Not only were the deficit targets
specified through FY 1993 as provided in GRH II, but now
several significant additional areas had been moved outside
the consideration of the budget process for the coming budget
cycle. Essentially, the previous resolution for FY 1988 was
superseded, and a large part of the resolution for FY 1989 was
completed in the budget summit.
As expected, budgeting in 1988 (FY 1989) proceeded with
relatively little conflict. President Reagan submitted a
budget which complied with the budget summit agreement and met
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the GRH II deficit target. Both houses approved budget
resolutions with a bipartisan consensus, the House on March 23
and the Senate on April 18. The conference on the budget
resolution lasted six weeks while members of the House and
Senate debated funding for science and space programs,
education and job training programs, and an anti-drug
initiative, areas not specified by the summit. For the first
time since 1979, no reconciliation instructions were required
by the budget resolution. OMB' s sequester report indicated
that GRH II deficit targets were met. Finally, just prior to
the end of the fiscal year, Congress completed its action on
all of the thirteen regular appropriations bills, a rarity in
recent budget history.
G. THE BUDGET SUMMIT OF 1989
During the 1989 (FY 1990) budget cycle, the Budget
Committees were almost as inactive as they had been the
previous year. Upon the submission of his first executive
budget request, which set broad spending and revenue targets,
President Bush invited Congress to work with him to resolve
the details. A budget summit began March 9. Representing the
administration were the Director of the 0MB Richard Darman,
and Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady. Among the Congres-
sional negotiators were House Majority Leader Thomas Foley,
and the Chairmen and ranking Republican members of the House
and Senate Budget Committees. 2U
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The budget summit agreement reached on April 14 was
similar to the previous budget summit agreement in 1987, with
discretionary spending levels specified for three broad
categories, Defense, Domestic, and International Affairs. The
anticipated deficit reduction of the agreement would total $28
billion, sufficient to reach the GRH II deficit target of $100
billion. 25 However, the deficit reduction agreed to in the
summit was criticized for not substantially affecting the
imbalance between revenues and spending. Much of the $28
billion in deficit reduction was comprised of one-time savings
or accounting tricks, including $5.3 billion in undefined new
revenues which would be left to the tax writing committees
later in the year. 26
As a result of the budget summit, the markup of the budget
resolution was largely academic. Returning to the Senate
Budget Committee, Chairman Jim Sasser and ranking minority
member Pete Domenici announced that they would oppose any
attempt to deviate from the summit agreement. 27 The
diminished role of the Budget Committees was iterated by SBC
member Kent Conrad who stated, "The operations of the Budget
Committee have been rendered largely irrelevant - we're just
going through the motions here." 28 However, the SBC had
little choice but to report the original proposal provided by
Senators Sasser and Domenici to the floor.
The markup of the budget resolution in the House Budget
Committee followed a similar pattern. House Budget Chairman
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Leon Panetta and ranking Republican Bill Frenzel were able to
rebuff all amendments offered by the committee which violated
the budget summit agreement. House Budget Committee member
Richard Durbin complained, MThe Budget Committee since the
stock market crash has become superfluous to this process - it
adds nothing, and members have virtually no voice in setting
priorities. n29
Both houses quickly passed their respective resolutions.
The conference on the budget resolution required only two days
before deciding to report a conference resolution which
deferred the issue of reconciliation until the Revenue
Committees and the administration decided how to raise the
$5.3 billion in unspecified revenues.
Throughout the summer, pieces of the reconciliation
package began to materialize. Consistent with the summit
agreement, few of the deficit reduction proposals would have
long term fiscal impact. Savings included $5.7 billion from
the sale of federal assets, $1.8 billion from the removal of
the U.S. Postal Service from the budget, and $2.9 billion from
another shift of a payday for military personnel. 30
In mid-August, the OMB issued a deficit projection of
$116.2 billion, requiring $16.2 billion in deficit reduction
to be achieved to avoid an October sequester. 31 However,
negotiation on the reconciliation bill between Congress and
the administration remained stalled over revenues,
particularly President Bush's insistence on a capital gains
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tax cut. President Bush eventually abandoned his quest for a
capital gains tax cut, but not before he ordered a sequester
which took effect on October 16.
Ultimately, the negotiations achieved only $14.7 billion
in deficit reduction, half of the amount agreed upon in the
budget summit the previous spring. 32 Nearly $4.6 billion
(approximately one third) of the $14.7 billion total was
achieved by retaining the sequester of discretionary accounts
for 130 days. 33 The reconciliation bill produced only $10.1
billion in deficit reduction. Although there were claims of
legitimate savings, much of the reconciliation bill was
comprised of one-time savings and accounting gimmicks. 34
Despite the budget summit of the previous spring and the
anticipation of a low conflict budget cycle, the year ended in
a sequester. As could be expected, the Budget Committees had
minimal impact on the process - their role being limited by
both summit and sequester.
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VI. THE BUDGET COMMITTEES AND THE
BUDGET ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 19 9
Prophetically, as Senator Pete Domenici stated in the
summer of 1989, "To the extent that you legitimately cheat or
legitimately fudge, you increase the difficulties in (FY) 1991
as far as achieving the Gramm-Rudman target of $64 billion." 1
A. THE BUDGET SUMMIT OF 19 9
The executive budget submitted by President Bush early in
1990 projected a deficit of $100.5 billion, requiring $36.5
billion in deficit reduction to meet the GRH target of $64.0
billion. 2 Again, the President's budget relied on optimistic
economic assumptions, a cut in the capital gains tax, and
staunch opposition to new taxes. The Congressional Budget
Office projected a more conservative deficit estimate of $138
billion for the current services budget. 3
Democrats immediately derided the executive budget.
However, by the April 15 deadline for Congress to have
completed action on the budget resolution, the Budget
Committees had not even begun to mark up their resolutions.
Aside from the perennial partisan conflict, the economy had
not performed as expected. These factors, along with the
amount of deficit reduction required, began to convince
Congress that the deficit target would not be met that year.
As Senator Bob Dole stated, "It is going to be harder to put
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together a viable budget resolution this year than other
years. That is because we have so far to go to meet the
Gramm-Rudman-Hol 1 ings target .
"
4
The House Budget Committee was the first of the two
committees to produce a budget resolution, despite HBC
chairman Leon Panetta admitting that the economic assumptions
and proposed savings were unrealistic. 5 Ironically, these
were the same reasons why President Bush's budget request was
criticized.
The submission of a politically and economically
unrealistic budget resolution is further evidence of the
diminishing importance of the Budget Committees. The resolu-
tion no longer provided a fiscal guideline. At best, it was
a position from which participants of the inevitable budget
summit would bargain. Ranking Republican on the HBC, Bill
Frenzel, commented on the role of the Budget Committees:
"Everyone participating in this debate understands that this
is not a x real' exercise . . . What we have here are
bargaining positions, not blueprints."6 The House approved
its version of the budget resolution on May 1.
In the Senate, members of the SBC were barely parti-
cipating in committee meetings, showing up only to vote. 7 The
SBC reported its budget resolution to the floor just as
President Bush invited members of Congress to preliminary
budget negotiations in early May. Congressional leaders
conceded and the first meetings began on May 15. Once again
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the budget process was circumvented in favor of a budget
summit.
Representing the administration in the budget summit were
White House Chief of Staff John Sununu, Director of OMB
Richard Darman, and Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady.
Negotiators from the House included Majority Leader
Richard Gephardt, Democratic Whip William Gray, Ways and Means
Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, Budget Committee Chairman
Leon Panetta, Appropriations Committee Chairman Jamie Whitten,
Republican Whip Newt Gingrich, ranking Republican on the Ways
and Means Committee Bill Archer, ranking Republican on the
Budget Committee Bill Frenzel, and Representative Silvio
Conte.
Negotiators from the Senate included Budget and Appropria-
tions Committee member Wyche Fowler acting as the representa-
tive of Majority Leader George Mitchell, Appropriations
Committee Chairman Robert Byrd, ranking Republican on the
Appropriations Committee Mark Hatfield, Budget Committee
Chairman Jim Sasser, ranking Republican on the Budget
Committee Pete Domenici, Finance Committee Chairman Lloyd
Bentsen, ranking Republican on the Finance Committee Bob
Packwood, and Budget Committee member Phil Gramm. 8
At the first meetings of the budget summit, OMB director
Richard Darman revised his deficit figures for 1991 to between
$123 billion and $138 billion. 9 The CBO's more conservative
figures projected a deficit between $149 billion to $159
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billion. 10 It was becoming more obvious that the GRH targets
would not be met.
The summit continued through early June when Appropria-
tions Committee leadership decided to proceed with the mark up
of the 13 appropriations bills. With the budget summit at an
impasse, the House budget resolution was regarded in that
chamber as the final resolution for the purposes of debating
appropriations bills on the floor. 11
As late as June 14, the Senate had not yet passed a budget
resolution. To avoid a point of order and allow the appro-
priations process to continue, the Senate accepted a
"skeletal" budget resolution, maintaining current spending
levels, and omitting any of the reconciliation assumptions
included in the SBC resolution. The Senate deferred to the
budget summit negotiations to produce a workable budget
resolution. 12
As the budget summit entered its sixth week, OMB revised
its deficit projection to $159 billion. 13 The CBO deficit
projection was revised to $162 billion. 14
New hope of a solution to the growing deficit came at the
end of June when President Bush stated that a deficit reduc-
tion package would need to include "tax revenue increases,"
apparently contradicting his pre-election pledge of no-new-
taxes. 15 While this was seen as a political victory for the
Democrats, congressional Republicans felt betrayed.
Unfortunately, this did little to resolve the specifics of a
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deficit reduction package, and the summit continued with
little progress.
With current projections indicating nearly $100 billion in
deficit reduction needed to be accomplished (more than twice
as much as had ever been achieved)
, a sequester of that
magnitude became unthinkable. The budget summit remained at
an impasse throughout the summer. It was almost as if budget
negotiators were biding their time until the inevitable budget
crisis would lend some superficial credibility to again
raising the GRH deficit limits and revising the budget
process.
A different crisis affected the budget negotiators when
Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2. National attention shifted
away from the budget summit and added new considerations for
deficit reduction.
The mid-August sequester report from OMB projected that
the deficit for FY 1991 would be $149.4 billion. 16 Failure
to reach the $64 billion GRH deficit target would result in a
sequester reducing military spending by 35.3 percent and non-
defense accounts by 32.4 percent. 17 A sequester of this
magnitude would be politically unthinkable, particularly with
U.S. troops being deployed to the Persian Gulf.
Negotiators met at Andrews Air Force Base on September 7
and returned after 10 days still at an impasse, Republicans
insisting on a capital gains tax cut and Democrats demanding
increases in domestic spending. A budget agreement was
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reached by the negotiators on September 30, relying on cuts in
Medicare and increased taxes to reduce the deficit by $40
billion. 18 The deficit reduction package was quickly
rejected by the House.
A stop-gap spending bill, an outcome of the failed budget
agreement, had suspended GRH sequestration and funded the
government for the first five days of the new fiscal year.
Without an acceptable budget resolution, President Bush vetoed
a second stop-gap measure, shutting down the government
October 6-8. 19 Congress worked throughout the Columbus day
weekend and finally produced a stripped down budget resolu-
tion, excluding some of the controversial tax and spending
provisions of the budget summit agreement. 20 Bush then
signed the second of four stop-gap bills which would be
required to fund the government until a reconciliation bill
could be produced.
With elections only weeks away, the House and Senate
Budget Committees quickly moved their reconciliation bills to
the floor, which then moved the bill to conference. The final
reconciliation bill, adopted by Congress on October 27 and
signed by President Bush on November 5, claimed to reduce the
deficit by $28 billion for FY 1991 and $236 billion over five
years. 21 Included in the budget reconciliation bill as the
last of thirteen titles was, once again, legislation which
radically revised the budget process - the Budget Enforcement
Act of 1990 (BEA)
.
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B. THE BUDGET ENFORCEMENT ACT
The BEA was more equitable than GRH in its treatment of
the different categories of spending. Discretionary spending
was separated from other portions of the budget such as
revenues and entitlements. Drawing on a procedure employed in
previous budget summits, the BEA divided discretionary
spending into three categories - Defense, International, and
Domestic. Spending caps were placed on each of the discre-
tionary categories for FY 1991-1993, with total discretionary
spending caps provided for FY 1994-1995 (see Table 9) . Funds
cannot be shifted between categories. Through FY 1993,
Congress will not be able to shift funds from defense or
international accounts to finance further increases in
domestic programs.
After Congress completes action on a discretionary
appropriation, the CBO submits its estimate of the impact of
the bill to the OMB. The 0MB then submits its evaluation of
the bill, with the CBO estimate, to Congress. Should
discretionary spending exceed the cap in any category, a
sequester occurs only within that category. Sequestration
takes place with 15 days after the end of a session of
Congress. 22 This provision shifts the role of the OMB from
issuing a once-a-year GRH sequester report to evaluating, on










DISCRETIONARY SPENDING CAPS UNDER THE BEA OF 1990
(billions of dollars)
Fiscal Year
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Defense
Budget Authority $288.9 $291.6 $291.8










Source: U.S., Statutes at Large . Vol. 104.
Upon submission of the executive budget, OMB must adjust
the discretionary spending caps to accommodate various
factors, including changes in concepts and definitions,
changes in inflation, and presidentially designated emergency
appropriations. The caps may also be adjusted for changes in
concepts and definitions or inflation with the August 20th
sequester report or the final sequester report 15 days after
the end of a Congressional session.
Discretionary spending was forced to bear the brunt of
the sequester under GRH, although direct spending accounts
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(entitlements and other spending programs not included in the
appropriations process) had a much greater impact on the
growth of the deficit. 23 The BEA segregated discretionary
spending from the direct spending portion of the budget.
Direct spending and revenues were addressed collectively
under a provision termed "Pay-As-You-Go" or "PAYGO." PAYGO
requires any legislation decreasing revenues or increasing
direct spending to be offset by cuts in other direct spending
accounts or increased revenues. After Congress completes
action on direct spending or revenue legislation, the CBO
submits its estimate of the bill's impact on the deficit to
the OMB. 0MB then submits its estimate with the CBO's to
Congress, within five days of the enactment of the legisla-
tion. Should the bill increase the deficit, a sequester would
occur for non-exempt direct spending accounts within 15 days
after Congress adjourns for that session. For the second time
since Congress began trying to legislate deficit targets in
1985, the deficit targets were again revised (see Table 10).
As with the discretionary spending caps, the president is
required to revise the maximum deficit totals. Revisions
would be submitted with the executive budget to account for
current estimates of economic and technical assumptions and
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Social Security trust funds, which had been sustaining a
surplus and masking the true size of the deficit, were taken
off budget. 24 This helped to justify the substantial
increase in the deficit targets, as the deficit would
automatically increase by approximately $60 billion without
the offset surplus of Social Security receipts. 25
The BEA retained the general sequester of GRH, although
this possibility was considered unlikely due to the
discretionary and PAYGO "mini-sequesters." Should the deficit
estimate exceed the BEA deficit target, the general sequester
would occur 15 days after Congress adjourns at the end of a
session.
C. IMPACT OF THE BEA
There was a definite shift in power between budget parti-
cipants with the legislation of the BEA. The administration
and the OMB had apparently gained the most, with scorekeeping
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authority over each spending or revenue bill. Most
congressional participants were disciplined in some capacity.
The Appropriations Committees and Subcommittees were confined
to work within the limits of the discretionary spending caps.
However, they were alleviated from the threat of a sequester
due to adverse economic indications or changes in other
portions of the budget. The Revenue and Authorizing
Committees were bound by the new PAYGO provisions.
Most affected by the BEA were the Budget Committees. By
incorporating the three capped discretionary categories of
previous summits, the BEA had reduced the influence of the
Budget Committees in the same way as the budget summit
agreements. The BEA had essentially provided a five year
budget resolution. Discretionary spending had been decided,
except for the subdivisions of the domestic category. Even in
this respect, the influence of the Budget Committees would be
advisory at best. Deficit totals were specified, as they had
been in the previous five years, keeping this portion of the
budget from the prerogative of Congress or the Budget
Committees.
The BEA minimized budgetary initiative. 26 Caps on
discretionary spending categories, and the separation of
discretionary spending from revenues and mandatory spending,
severely reduced the option of setting fiscal priorities.
Further, the PAYGO procedure established a bias toward
existing programs which would be allowed to continue to grow
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through indexation. Establishing fiscal priorities and
deficit parameters was the primary purpose of the Budget
Committees. The BEA had obviated that purpose, at least until
1995.
Despite claims of an important enforcement role for the
Budget Committees under the BEA, OMB with their perpetual
oversight of all revenue and spending bills, would more
appropriately be referred to as the guardian of the process.
At best, the role of the Budget Committees had been relegated
to producing budget resolutions which would merely reaffirm
Congress' commitment to the BEA.
D. BUDGETING UNDER THE BEA
Budgeting began for 1992, the first year under the new
legislation, with the House voting to change one of the
provisions of the BEA. In the first days of January, the
Democratic majority carried a vote of 242-160 to change the
House rules shifting scorekeeping authority from the OMB to
CBO. This was perhaps an indication of how willing the House
was to live under the restrictions of the BEA. 27
Shortly thereafter, the Senate voted to reaffirm their
commitment to the BEA. The provisions of the BEA required an
automatic vote by the Senate to suspend the provisions of the
legislation in the event of a recession. In late January,
both CBO and OMB reported two consecutive quarters of negative
economic growth. Under the urging of SBC Chairman Jim Sasser
and ranking Republican Peter Domenici, the Senate voted 2-97
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to reject a measure to suspend the new legislation. 28
Subsequently, the Senate would repeat this reaffirmation of
the BEA on two occasions in 1991.
On February 4, President Bush submitted his FY 1992 budget
request, which included outlays of $1,445.9 billion and
revenues of $1,165.0 billion. 29 As the deficit totals in the
BEA could be revised, the BEA had shifted the emphasis of
federal budgeting from deficit reduction to spending control.
As a result, there was little attempt on the part of the
administration to mask the deficit of $280.9 billion.
The mark up of both the HBC and SBC resolutions proceeded
with relatively little conflict. However, the HBC was
constrained, as language in the BEA allowed the Appropriations
Committee to proceed with discretionary spending allocations
based on the President's budget, should Congress fail to adopt
a budget resolution by April 15. Further, the Appropriations
Committee could bring appropriations bills to the floor on May
15 regardless of whether Congress had adopted a budget
resolution. The House passed its budget resolution, differing
only slightly from the President's budget, on April 17. 30
In the Senate most of the conflict centered on certain
language of the BEA which Democrats had altered just before
the final vote on the legislation the previous year. The
language would ease the passage of an amendment, sponsored by
Senator Patrick Moynihan, to provide a Social Security tax
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cut. Regardless, the Senate approved a budget resolution
without the Social Security tax cut on April 25. 31
The budget resolution moved through conference with
minimal conflict over language in the Senate version
prohibiting the use of new taxes to pay for expanded
entitlement programs. The language was removed in conference
and Congress adopted the budget resolution on May 22. 32
However, this unusually early conclusion to the budget process
was not soon enough for the House Appropriations Committee
which had begun drafting its own spending plan the previous
week. This action served to emphasize the irrelevance of the
budget resolution.
Despite the hopes of Congress and the administration for
the BEA, deficit estimates dramatically increased over the
summer. The original BEA deficit target for FY 1992 was
$317.0 billion. On July 15, the OMB released an FY 1992
deficit projection of $348.3 billion. 33 In August, the CBO
confirmed the increase with a FY 1992 deficit projection of
$362.0 billion. M In hearings before the Task Force on the
Budget Process, Reconciliation, and Enforcement, Allen Schick
called for the BEA to be revised, stating, "the BEA has not
resolved the deficit crisis in federal budgeting." 35
E. THE FUTURE OF THE BEA
Budget reform is only effective until Congress is able to
find a way to circumvent the constraints of the legislation.
Throughout the appropriations process there were several
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indications of the unwillingness of Congress to remain within
the bounds of the BEA. In both houses, the designation of
"emergency" was creatively applied to some programs, making
spending contingent upon the President declaring an emergency
and suspending the provisions of the BEA. 36 OMB claims some
programs have been deliberately underfunded in order to create
an emergency. 37 Expenditures have been delayed, allowing
spending to remain under the 1992 caps, but making it more
difficult to remain within future spending limits. 38
In late September, President Bush removed the bombers of
the Strategic Air Command from their 24 hour alert status and
pledged unilateral reductions in nuclear forces. Reduction of
U.S. strategic forces lends credibility to the perception of
a diminishing threat and legitimizes the sentiment to further
reduce future defense spending. This is not prohibited under
the BEA. However, the BEA does prohibit savings from the
defense discretionary category from being used to increase
funding for other spending categories. Hence, members of
Congress with a domestic agenda are advocating the revision of
the BEA as a means of redressing fiscal priorities.
Two of the more prominent advocates of budget reform are
the Chairmen of the Budget Committees. In early October,
House Budget Committee Chairman Leon Panetta announced a ten
year budget reform proposal relying on heavy defense cuts to
finance domestic concerns such as education and health, as
well as economic growth and deficit reduction. 39 However,
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Panetta (one of the architects of the BEA) does not advocate
revising the budget agreement until there is consensus on a
long range budget plan. 40
Other members of Congress are not so cautious. Later in
October, Senate Budget Committee Chairman Jim Sasser and
Finance Committee Chairman Lloyd Bentsen proposed discarding
the BEA in order to free defense funds to finance a tax break
for the middle class. 41
With the apparently diminishing threat from the Soviet
Union and the rapid conclusion of the Gulf War, Congress
increasingly looks toward the defense discretionary spending
category as a source of funds for domestic spending. This
would obviously require changing the BEA to allow funds to be
shifted between discretionary categories before 1993.
Clearly, defense funds will be a central issue for future
budget reform. Less than a year after it was signed into law,
the validity of the BEA has been brought into question, as
cries go up to again revise the process.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
Since the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Congress has
used three approaches to the conflict inherent in the budget
process. The first attempt relied on the Budget Committees to
set fiscal priorities. Subsequent strategies were to resolve
budget issues through broad coalitions, and through legislated
budget formulas. None of these approaches have been entirely
successful
.
An indication of the failure of the budget process has
been the deficit, the chronic imbalance between revenues and
spending. There have been periods in our history when deficit
spending was warranted. However, few would agree that
persistent deficit spending during periods of economic growth
is sound fiscal policy.
The creation of the Budget Committees was the first
strategy used to address fiscal priorities and the relative
levels of spending and revenues. These committees were
effective primarily in institutionalizing the process during
the first years of congressional budgeting. Their impact
would not be fully realized until the election of President
Reagan.
The Budget Committees most striking effect on the federal
budget was during the Reagan budget revolution in 1981.
This was not because of the inherent power of the Budget
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Committees, but because they were part of a larger
Republican/Boll Weevil coalition. Ironically, the impact of
the 1981 budget cycle would signal the decline of the Budget
Committees. Once budget resolutions and reconciliation were
used to radically affect fiscal policy, a diversity of
interests was drawn into the budget process. This diversity
required the formation of larger coalitions to ensure the
adoption and implementation of budget resolutions. The budget
process - and therefore the Budget Committees - was over-
shadowed as party leadership met in budget summits to
determine fiscal guidelines.
Pressures to simultaneously increase spending, reduce
taxes, and balance the budget place unreasonable expectations
on legislators. Only two of the three demands can be
consistently satisfied. However, tax increases and spending
cuts would have direct repercussions on constituents.
Deficits inherently allowed the impact to be indirect or
deferred. Consequently, as conflict necessarily increased
with the interests represented by broad coalitions, larger
deficits became the default solution to partisan conflict.
As the size of the deficit increased, so did speculation
about the consequences of the persistent and rapidly growing
deficit. The deficit was no longer simply the difference
between spending and revenues. The magnitude of the deficit
caused it to became an entity in itself. Questions were
raised about the impact of large and persistent deficits on
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the economy. Tolerance for deficit financing diminished, and
Congress moved to distance itself from the painful choices
this intolerance might have forced it to make.
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) served to redirect responsi-
bility for painful fiscal decisions. A sequester would make
spending cuts if Congress could not. Legislating deficit
totals continued to obscure the impact of the Budget
Committees. The Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) is the most
recent of this type of automatic budgeting legislation. The
BEA is more refined than GRH, but forces an increasingly
larger portion of the budget resolution out of the direct
control by any budget participant, including the Budget
Committees.
A recurring theme throughout the history of the congres-
sional budget process is that Congress is unwilling to allow
itself to be restrained by its own budget reform. There are
numerous examples. The process was circumvented by summitry.
Deadlines on the budget timetable were missed, and budget
events taken out of order. Overly optimistic economic
projections and accounting gimmicks were used to meet deficit
totals. Deficit totals were revised when it became evident
they would not be met. Sequesters were rescinded. Legisla-
tion was amended. To paraphrase Allen Schick - the budget
process was saved by changing it every year. 1
In light of the inability of Congress to allow itself to
be bound by previous budget reform, it seems unlikely that the
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BEA will remain in effect in its present form through its full
duration. As world events redirect national attention back
toward domestic affairs, the growing sentiment to affect
fiscal policy increases the probability that the process will
again be revised. While an election year may not be conducive
to a complete overhaul of the budget process, it is likely
that the barrier between defense and non-defense discretionary
spending will be the subject of intense debate.
Whatever the direction of the federal budget process after
the 1992 elections, recent budget history suggests that the
role of the Budget Committees will be defined by several major
variables. These include the extent to which elections
produce divided government; the extent to which Congress and
the executive branch support deficit reduction as a major
budget policy; the structure of the congressional committee
system; and the leadership exercised by the Budget Committee
Chairmen.
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